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The Palliation of Dying: A Heideggerian Analysis of the 
“Technologization” of Death1 
 
by Franco A. Carnevale 
The modern West has vigorously sought to overcome death, or at the very least minimize the suffering that it 
entails. Whereas the former has been predominantly pursued through modern scientific medicine, the 
minimization of the adversity of death and dying has been sought through ‘death technologies’. This 
technologization of death is analyzed in light of Martin Heidegger’s phenomenological philosophy.  The 
analysis begins with an outline of the fundamental tenets of Heidegger’s ‘philosophy of Being’. In turn, his 
philosophical framework is utilized to highlight the manner in which the technologization of dying serves to 
conceal the central existential questions about being and finitude that dying gives rise to. The paper 
concludes with a discussion of how Heidegger’s work can inspire a more authentic stance toward dying. Leo 
Tolstoy’s The Death of Ivan Ilych is referred to in order to illustrate Heidegger’s construal of this existential 
struggle toward dying. 
 
 
                                                          
1 I am deeply indebted to Professor R. Philip Buckley (Department of Philosophy, McGill University) for his 
instruction and guidance in the preparation of this paper.  However, I am fully responsible for all of the 
paper’s limitations. 
On thinking about death 
When thinking here is not done 
‘fundamental-ontologically’ with the 
intention of grounding the truth of be-
ing, the worst and most absurd 
misinterpretations creep in and spread - 
and, naturally a ‘philosophy of death’ is 
made up (Heidegger, 1989/1999, p. 
199). 
 
The Death of Ivan Illych 
Ivan Ilych saw that he was dying, and 
he was in continual despair. 
In the depth of his heart he knew he 
was dying, but not only was he not 
accustomed to the thought, he simply 
did not and could not grasp it. 
‘If I had to die ... I should have known it 
was so. An inner voice would have told 
me so, but there was nothing of the sort 
in me ... And now here it is!’ he said to 
himself. ‘It can’t be.  It’s impossible!  But 
here it is.  How is this? How is one to 
understand it?’ 
He could not understand it, and tried to 
drive this false, incorrect, morbid 
thought away and to replace it by other 
proper and healthy thoughts. But that 
thought, and not the thought only but 
the reality itself, seemed to come and 
confront him. 
And to replace that thought he called up 
a succession of others, hoping to find in 
them some support. He tried to get 
back into the former current of thoughts 
that had once screened the thought of 
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death from him. But strange to say, all 
that had formerly shut off, hidden and 
destroyed his consciousness of death, 
no longer had that effect (Tolstoy, 
1886/1960, p. 129-130). 
 
Introduction 
Tolstoy’s Ivan Ilych is overcome with dread and 
anxiety toward his own imminent death. He 
struggles to retrieve his usual everyday ways of 
putting death out of his mind. Yet he does not 
succeed.  Ilych becomes distressed by death’s 
omnipresence as it transforms every aspect of his 
being. 
 
Tolstoy powerfully portrays a distressing stance 
toward death that stands in sharp contrast to the 
prevalent ‘philosophies of death’ in modern 
Western life that seek to bring comfort and peace 
to those that are dying or grieving.i  
 
The aim of this paper is to discuss the prevalent 
view towards death in the modern West in light 
of Martin Heidegger’s ‘philosophy of Being.’ I 
begin with a sketch of what the current stance 
toward death commonly looks like - or at least 
attempts to look like (throughout this paper, the 
discussion is devoted exclusively to the modern 
Western context). I then analyze this 
phenomenon in terms of Heidegger’s account of 
modern science and technology. Then, I will 
discuss an ‘authentic’ conception of death in light 
of Heidegger’s philosophical analysis of Being 
(the terms ‘Being’ and ‘Be-ing’ will be used 
deliberately to distinguish the diverse 
significations implied by Heidegger in his 
respective earlier and his later thinkingii). The 
‘Heideggerian’ outlook does not stand in 
opposition to the modern scientific view of death. 
Rather, it includes the latter into a broader 
foundational conception of Being.  I will end by 
outlining the significance of poiesis in arriving at 
an authentic stance toward death. 
 
 
Dying ‘Western Style’ 
Death is surrounded by a mix of ‘traditional’ as 
well as largely contemporary practices. In the 
presence of death (imminent or actual), many 
ideas and ritual comportments are called upon 
from tradition and religion. Prayer and religious 
sacramental acts are engaged, frequently even 
among persons who do not ordinarily live 
‘religiously.’ The practices enacted toward the 
final disposition of a deceased person are 
particularly religion-oriented, commonly turning 
to funeral services followed by burial or 
cremation practices that can be conducted with 
varying levels of religiosity. This 
‘modernization’ of religion, wherein selected 
rituals are retained while the underlying spiritual 
and ontological worldviews are discarded, 
accords with Charles Taylor’s analysis of 
morality in the context of modernity. The rise of 
secularized mechanistic individualism in the 
modern West has resulted in a prioritization of 
procedures while forgetting about the substantive 
moral values that once gave such procedures 
meaning (Taylor, 1989). 
 
The focus in the context of death is heavily 
centered on the proper handling of the deceased 
body, while religious ceremonial acts 
commemorate the person’s spiritual life. In cases 
where the body cannot be retrieved (as was the 
case for so many in the September 11th attacks), 
the death and its accompanying grief are 
profoundly deranged and destabilizing.  Indeed, 
this is so profound that extraordinary ‘heroic’ 
efforts will be pursued in order to find the body 
in order to ‘correct’ the wrongful death.iii 
 
Upon this traditional corpus of ideas and 
practices, we have seen in recent decades, the 
emergence of ‘death enhancement’ initiatives. 
Efforts that strive to make death less distressing. 
These include various formulations of ‘death 
philosophies,’ like the work of Elizabeth Kübler-
Ross (1969). These have drawn on an extensive 
body of research to depict how death and dying 
commonly (i.e., ‘normally’) unfold. For example, 
various stages of dying have been mapped out 
such as disbelief, bargaining, anger, depression, 
and acceptance. Experts have emerged with 
expertise in ‘grief therapy’ who employ 
instrumental strategies that aim to foster ‘normal’ 
dying or grieving. 
This has become part of a larger initiative that I 
shall refer to collectively as death technologies. 
Medicine has created a field of sub-
specialization, palliative care, which aims to 
foster ‘a good death’. This typically means a 
death that is peaceful with minimal or no pain 
and discomfort. Palliative care has developed 
various pharmacological regimens to help control 
pain and other symptoms associated with dying 
(e.g., nausea, muscle spasms, or depression).iv 
Interestingly, it could be noted that this medical 
specialty emerged in part to counter the 
increasingly ‘violent’ deaths that many were 
enduring subsequent to the rise of high-
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technology resuscitative medicine. Marijuana is 
becoming increasingly popular in this domain. 
On occasion, pharmacological strategies are 
combined with a ‘useful’ use of the arts - such as 
music or visual arts - to help foster comfort 
among the dying. 
 
Popular opinion polls increasingly demonstrate 
an interest in euthanasia (which has been 
legalized in the Netherlands). This seems to be 
related to a profound preoccupation with the 
possibility of dying a painfully tormented death. 
Many people would like to be able to decide 
when and how they should die. Euthanasia 
essentially assures this, while palliative care (in 
areas where euthanasia is not legalized) attempts 
to allow the dying person and family also to have 
some control over the process of dying. 
 
A further recent phenomenon has been the 
emergence of advance directives - commonly 
referred to as ‘living wills’.  This legalized 
instrument enables a person to decide in advance 
how he or she would like to be cared for in the 
face of a life-threatening illness, and who should 
serve as a surrogate decision-maker in the event 
the person becomes unable to speak for 
him/herself.  This ‘empowers’ persons with some 
capacity to define how they ought to die. The 
legal status of advance directives has normalized 
such wishes as formal duties for those around the 
dying person (i.e., family members and health 
care professionals).  
 
Preliminary Critique 
The emergence of the death technologies 
described above can be characterized as a 
technologization of death - a turn to technology 
(predominantly medical) to mend an ailment.  
Just as medical technology has helped ‘heal’ 
many other modern ailments, it has now offered 
to research and intervene upon death.  
 
A common thread that can be identified 
throughout the various initiatives described is the 
pursuit of self-determination.  Indeed, a central 
tenet of palliative care (and in particular 
euthanasia where it is accepted) is respect for a 
person’s autonomy. That is, a primacy has been 
attributed to enabling persons to be self-
determining such that their wishes ought to 
command profound recognition. This can be 
related to the rise of individualism in modernity, 
whereby each person should be allowed to map 
out their own destiny to the greatest extent 
possible (Carnevale, 1999; Taylor, 1992).  
Consequently, medical and legal means have 
been created to enable such self-determining 
persons to pursue these ends. 
 
A critique of this outlook could challenge this 
underlying premise of self-determination.  Does 
it necessarily follow that a stated preference 
expresses self-determination? It would seem 
important to examine what signification of ‘self’ 
is implied here.  We could likely infer that one’s 
‘true self’ is intended.  It is commonly 
recognized that if one is mentally incapacitated, 
then one’s capacity for self-determination is 
regarded as compromised because one’s true self 
is no longer accessible. However, this legalistic / 
psychiatric stance toward personal autonomy 
privileges the faculty of discernment without any 
regard for the ‘essence’ of such thinking. The 
notion of self-determination should be linked to a 
substantive consideration of the nature or 
substance of selfhood that discernment is oriented 
toward. 
 
A skeptical critique of this modern orientation to 
death could also refute it as a technological 
encroachment upon human life: modern scientific 
technology that has gone too far. Although some 
merit could be found in such a negative stance, 
Heidegger’s work on being, death, science, and 
technology offers the possibility of construing 
such criticisms within a positive account. 
Heidegger offers us a way to recognize science 
and technology as part of a broader human 
striving.  According to Heidegger, a fundamental 
problem arises when science and technology are 






I have turned to Martin Heidegger’s philosophy 
for this paper, aiming to illustrate the merits of 
his phenomenology for the health and social 
sciences. Various formulations of 
phenomenology have emerged within these 
disciplines, including medicine (Toombs, 2001), 
nursing (Benner, 1994), psychology (Giorgi, 
1985), anthropology (Geertz, 1973), and 
sociology (Schutz, 1971-1972). These 
formulations are variously referred to as 
phenomenology, interpretive phenomenology, 
interpretivism, or hermeneutics. Drawing on the 
philosophies of Edmund Husserl, Martin 
Heidegger, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty, and Charles Taylor, these 
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important works strive to counter the prevailing 
universalized objectivism of the scientific 
paradigm with an orientation that is centered on 
experience, arguing that understanding is 
necessarily a subjective meaning-centered 
phenomenon. 
 
However, these initiatives are confronted by the 
methodological conventions of science that call 
for verifiable and generalizable truths in order to 
justify changes of policy or the provision of 
services. Consequently, considerable attention 
has been devoted toward enhancing the 
instrumental rigor of these approaches, to help 
ensure a correspondence between the findings of 
such phenomenological analyses and the ‘reality’ 
that they are examining (Carnevale, 2002; Denzin 
& Lincoln, 1994). This risks a drifting away from 
the fundamental tenets that underlie these 
approaches. 
 
In this paper, I have attempted a 
phenomenological analysis of a health and social 
problem - death - within a Heideggerian 
framework, which is an ontologically-oriented 
phenomenology.  My aim has been to remain as 
‘authentically faithful’ to Heidegger’s ideas as 
possible. Moreover, this analysis examines the 
phenomenological significances of technology 
and being as a precondition for unconcealing 
death in Heideggerian terms.  
 
This work draws on four principal texts: Being 
and Time (1962), Contributions to Philosophy 
(From Enowning) (1989/1999), The Question 
Concerning Technology (1962/1977), and 
Science and Reflection (1977). The first two have 
been selected because they provide explications 
of Heidegger’s (early and late, respectively) 
overall philosophy of phenomenology, whereas 
the latter two specifically examine science and 
technology.v  My discussion of the modern 
Western view of death and its technologization 
(largely through medical science) will be related 
to Heidegger’s phenomenology of science and 
technology.  
 
Writing from the perspective of both a 
phenomenologist and a palliative care health care 
professional, the position that I have adopted is 
congruent with that of Heidegger: I seek neither 
to criticize nor endorse the technologization of 
death. Rather, I am proposing the utility of a 
phenomenological contemplation of the 
existential significance of this technologization.  
In particular, such a contemplation enables an 
illuminated understanding of the meaning of 
death and our relation to death, which is a 
necessary condition for authentic dying and 




Technology, Science, and Being 
In The Question Concerning Technology, 
Heidegger asserts 
Everywhere we remain unfree and 
chained to technology ... But we are 
delivered over to it in the worst possible 
way when we regard it as something 
neutral; for this conception of it ... 
makes us utterly blind to the essence of 
technology (Heidegger, 1962/1977, p. 
4).  
Heidegger is concerned about our lack of 
questioning regarding our relationship to 
technology - most importantly, toward its 
essence.  He offers an analysis of technology 
related to its implied essence, beginning with 
how it is commonly regarded. 
 
In the prevalent instrumental view, technology is 
seen as a means and as a human activity.  
Something that we aim to master.  As a means, 
this is something whereby a thing is effected or 
attained - implying causality. This seeks to 
unlock concealed energy from nature and order it 
into a standing reserve stockpile (i.e., a resource 
that can be manipulated or controlled by 
humans).  Heidegger refers to this stance as 
Enframing: the containment of nature by humans 
solely to serve the instrumental ends of humans 
(Heidegger, 1962/1977, p. 15-19).  
 
Such Enframing can consequently prescribe the 
manner in which all history is determined 
(destining), whereby the unrecognized domains 
of Being remain concealed.  That is, since it is 
only one way of understanding the phenomena of 
Being, Enframing risks the danger of 
misinterpreting everything within a cause-effect 
coherence – oblivious to the existential 
phenomena that underlie our striving to contain 
and control nature through cause-effect 
technological theories. 
 
In Science and Reflection, Heidegger traces the 
signification that has been attributed to theory.  
In ancient Greece, theory meant to look at 
something attentively ‘wherein what presences 
becomes visible and, through such sight - seeing 
- to linger with it’ (Heidegger, 1977, p. 163). 
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Through the ‘ages’, theory has been transformed 
within modern science into an observing that 
seeks to entrap and secure - refining the real 
(Heidegger, 1977, p. 167).  Consequently, the 
real in nature presents itself as surveyable for an 
entrapping representation within an instrumental 
coherence.  Heidegger goes on to assert that such 
a view of the real will necessarily give rise to a 
compartmentalized science - fixing it into one 
object-area at a time whereby science claims to 
stands in an objective stance toward nature 
(objectness). 
 
Yet Heidegger argues that the sciences will 
ultimately be impotent because objectness 
represents only one kind of attuning for any 
given time and place.  That which remains 
inaccessible to such a science will be constantly 
concealed.  For example, the study of nature 
through physics represents only one manner in 
which nature is present – the whole of nature 
cannot be enframed through this one way. 
 
In the light of science’s inability to access that 
which cannot be enframed, Heidegger calls for a 
different kind of questioning: reflection.  
[Reflection] is calm, self-possessed 
surrender to that which is worthy of 
questioning ... In reflection we gain 
access to a place from out of which 
there first opens the space traversed at 
any given time by all our doing and 
leaving undone ... [R]eflection first 
brings us onto the way toward the place 
of our sojourning (Heidegger, 1977, p. 
180-181).  
Heidegger’s analysis of technology outlines two 
distinctive forms of thought: calculative and 
contemplative (Buckley, 1992). Calculative 
thought is centered on measurement and is 
oriented toward manipulation and control, 
striving to attain certainty and security. In 
contrast, contemplative thought seeks to question 
the meaning of things, particularly, the 
meaningful thinking of Being. 
 
Buckley (1992) highlights how representational 
thinking is central to Heidegger’s explication of 
the above distinction.  Essential to traditional 
philosophy and modern science,  
Representational thought treats the 
world or reality itself as if it were a 
picture ... wherein so much energy has 
been spent on how the subject gets a 
correct picture of the world, how this 
picture is given, how the picture is 
‘focused’ (Buckley, 1992, p. 236).   
This distinction between calculative and 
contemplative thought is qualitative rather than 
quantitative. That is, the former should not be 
regarded as a lesser version of the latter. They are 
essentially incommensurate. 
 
Buckley also points out that Heidegger does not 
view calculative thought - central to modern 
science - as negative. ‘The problem occurs when 
calculative thought becomes exclusive’ (Buckley, 
1992, p. 238). This risks the potential for science 
to become a mere technique without true 
understanding – ‘an activity in passivity.’  
Heidegger’s challenge seeks to demonstrate that 
calculation is but one form of thought, while 
arguing for a leap toward contemplative thought. 
 
Heidegger’s (1962/1977) Question Concerning 
Technology provides an illustration of such 
contemplative thought.  Parallel to his analysis of 
the prevalent modern understanding of 
technology (outlined above), he traces the 
signification of cause to Greek antiquity. Here he 
reveals that although cause is related to that 
which brings about effects, it is also that to which 
something else is indebted - that which is 
responsible for the effect (Heidegger, 1962/1977, 
p. 7). This responsible way of being 
correspondingly brings things to presence. 
 
Every occasion for whatever passes 
over and goes forward into presencing 
from that which is not presencing is 
poiesis, is bringing forth ... It is of utmost 
importance that we think bringing-forth 
in its full scope and at the same time in 
the sense in which the Greeks thought 
it. Not only handcraft manufacture, not 
only artistic and poetical bringing into 
appearance and concrete imagery, is a 
bringing-forth, poiesis.  Physis also, the 
arising of something from out of itself, is 
a bringing-forth, poiesis ... For what 
presences by means of physis has the 
bursting open belonging to bringing-forth 
... Bringing-forth brings hither out of 
concealment forth into unconcealment 
... within what we call revealing 
(Heidegger, 1962/1977, p. 10-11).vi  
 
This revealing was referred to by the Greeks as 
aletheia.  In other words, the instrumentality of 
technology is responsible for poetically bringing 
forth a revealing unconcealment. 
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Whereas technique in the modern sense refers to 
an essence-less skill, techne in the ancient Greek 
sense is linked to episteme - knowing in the 
widest sense - belonging to bringing-forth, to 
poiesis (Heidegger, 1962/1977, p. 13).  Knowing, 
in the techne sense, reveals and opens up. 
 
This analytical explication reveals the essence of 
technology for Heidegger.  He argues that the 
essence of modern technology lies in Enframing. 
When we experience the Enframing of 
technology as such, within its essence, we will 
experience that it  
in no way confines us to a stultified 
compulsion to push on blindly with 
technology or ... to rebel helplessly 
against it and curse it as the work of the 
devil.  Quite to the contrary, when we 
once open ourselves expressly to the 
essence of technology, we find 
ourselves unexpectedly taken into a 
freeing claim (Heidegger, 1962/1977, p. 
25-26).  
The revealing that comes from the contemplation 
of the essence of technology gives rise to a 
truthful freeing.  
 
But despite this, how are we to understand the 
predominance of calculative thought?  Heidegger 
relates this to the preponderance of machination 
inherently concealed within Being.  Machination 
- linked to techne and poiesis - is rooted in the 
human capacity for making.  It is governed by a 
logic of calculability, speed, and enormity 
(Heidegger, 1989/1999, p. 84-85).  
 
Machination as the essential swaying of 
beingness yields a faint hint of the truth 
of be-ing itself ... It seems to be a law of 
machination ... that the more powerfully 
it unfolds ... the more stubbornly and 
more machinationingly it hides itself as 
such (Heidegger, 1989/1999, p. 88-89).  
 
Thus, technology needs to be understood in terms 
of Heidegger’s ultimate ground for questioning: 
the question of Being.  His thinking on the 
question of Being is most notably worked 
through in Being and Time (1962), while he 
provides what could be called an extension of 
this work in Contributions to Philosophy 
(1989/1999), among other later works.  I shall 
now very briefly outline these works, as a 
prelude to reviewing Heidegger‘s discussion of 
death. 
 
The Question of Being/Be-ing 
In Being and Time, Heidegger (1962) argues for 
a fundamental ontology, through an existential 
analysis of Dasein, along with a destructuring of 
the history of ontology.vii  While Dasein is the 
type of being that struggles with its own question 
of Being, it also lives in the average 
everydayness of ‘the they’ (das Man), while 
struggling to ‘Be’ in a communal ‘We.’  
Everyday life in ‘the they’ refers to a routine 
mode of living ‘among the masses’ focused 
primarily on being expedient and instrumentally 
effective, without regard for any underlying 
existential worries.  
 
Through the course of this analysis of Being, 
Heidegger argues that the formal existential 
totality of Dasein’s ontological structural whole 
is defined by care.  He highlights that 
‘Temporality reveals itself as the meaning of 
authentic care ... Temporality makes possible the 
unity of existence, facticity, and falling, and in 
this way constitutes primordially the totality of 
the structure of care’ (Heidegger, 1962, p. 374, 
376). 
 
Temporality makes possible the structure of 
Dasein’s Being-in-the-world (i.e., Being’s 
absorptive presence in its world). This is 
characterized as a three-fold structure of care: 
futural (Being-ahead-of-itself), present (Being-
alongside), and past (Being-already-in). These 
temporal horizons determine the basis upon 
which entities are disclosed to Dasein. 
 
Criticizing the limits of conventional ontology in 
analyzing the question of Being, Contributions to 
Philosophy (Heidegger, 1989/1999) focuses 
principally on a call for a fundamentally new 
kind of ontology. Heidegger also discusses the 
between - wherein Be-ing sways between the 
prevalent ontology and the new one that he is 
calling for.  He further analyzes the leap that is 
required for crossing into the new ontology (a 
new beginning), to assume a form of Be-ing that 
he characterizes as Enownment.  Enownment 




In Being and Time, Heidegger construes death 
not as a factical (i.e., possible ways to be, such as 
roles) nor an ontical (i.e., regarding beings as 
things and not as a way of being) moment, but as 
a positive possibility of Dasein’s existence, that 
contains the possibility not to be. Through 
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encounters with the death of others, Dasein 
discovers that it cannot die for another Dasein, 
nor can another Dasein die for it.  It is revealed to 
Dasein that death is one thing that is its ownmost 
- that ‘the they’ cannot possess. 
The full existential-ontological 
conception of death may now be 
defined as follows: death, as the end of 
Dasein, is Dasein’s ownmost possibility 
- non-relational, certain and as such 
indefinite, not to be outstripped.  Death 
is, as Dasein’s end, in the Being of this 
entity towards its end (Heidegger, 1962, 
p. 303).  
Death discloses to Dasein that its Being is 
temporally futural. It is not a point that Dasein 
approaches. Rather, it is something that comes to 
Dasein.  Death is not something in the future that 
is not yet present, but it is very much a part of 
Dasein’s existence. 
 
Authentic Being-towards-death - that is 
to say, the finitude of temporality - is the 
hidden basis of Dasein’s historicality 
(Heidegger, 1962, p. 386).  
 
For Heidegger, only Dasein is capable of 
authentic dying.  He construes Dasein as a Being-
toward-death. The hyphens imply that this is not 
a subject toward object relationship. 
 
In its authentic encounter with death, Dasein 
reaches a completeness, its totality of 
possibilities, never to be added to. As Dasein 
understands the possibility not to be, all other 
possibilities are placed into a new light. Death 
reveals a ground for Dasein’s freedom, in that it 
is free to take up possibilities of ‘the they’ as its 
own.  Dasein can truly choose freely in light of 
its understanding of its own finitude.  In such a 
light, Dasein will see the factical life in ‘the they’ 
differently - as inauthentic and as ‘pseudo-
possibilities.’  In this way, Dasein’s confrontation 
with death can provide a way out of its ‘crisis of 
forgetfulness’ (i.e., its own concealment of its 
distress toward death) (Buckley, 1992, p. 170). 
  
Thus, freedom can result as a consequence of 
Dasein’s Being-toward-death.  However, that 
which is revealed in the face of death can also 
overwhelm Dasein toward seeking refuge in 
some form of concealment, just as Ivan Ilych 
attempted (Buckley, 1992, p. 170). 
 
In relation to encounters with the death of others, 
Dasein will be inclined in the everydayness of 
‘the they’ to leap in and attempt to try to take 
death away from others.viii  In an authentic Being-
toward-death, Dasein will leap ahead and strive 
to give death back to the other. 
 
In Contributions to Philosophy, Heidegger argues 
that the uniqueness of death for Dasein opens up 
what is most non-ordinary to it. Be-ing-toward-
death is not a nullity but an opening of time-
space. Heidegger cautions that when thinking in 
the face of death is not grounded in the truth of 
Be-ing, this can give rise to mistaken 
‘philosophies of death’ (he refers to 
misinterpretations of Being and Time that have 
contributed to this) (Heidegger, 1989/1999, p. 
199). 
 
Be-ing-toward-death is to be grasped 
as determination of Da-sein and only as 
such.  Here the utmost appraisal of 
temporality is enacted ... Thus not in 
order to negate ‘be-ing’ but in order to 
install the ground of its full and essential 
affirmability ... But what is at stake is 
not to dissolve humanness into death 
and to declare it for sheer nothingness 
but the opposite: to draw death into 
Dasein in order to master Dasein in its 
breadth as abground and thus fully 
appraise the ground of the possibility of 
the truth of be-ing) (Heidegger, 
1989/1999, p. 200).  
 
This discussion of death in Contributions to 
Philosophy builds on an analysis of machination 
and the abandonment of being presented earlier 
in the book.  Heidegger refers to the 
contemporary era as ‘the epoch of the total lack 
of questioning’ (Heidegger, 1989/1999, p. 76).  
Herein, the interpretation of Being has been 
relegated to machination (i.e., a mechanization of 
human life), subjected to ‘calculation, pro-
duction, and execution’ such that nothing that is 
question-worthy is pursued (Heidegger, 
1989/1999, p. 76).  This is characterized as the 
abandonment of being. 
 
The abandonment of being refers to a withdrawal 
from the question of being.  ‘Abandonment of 
being means that be-ing abandons beings and 
leaves beings to themselves and thus lets beings 
become objects of machination’ (Heidegger, 
1989/1999, p. 78).  ‘To this abandonment 
belongs forgottenness of being and at the same 
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time the disintegration of truth’ (Heidegger, 
1989/1999, p. 79).  
 
Heidegger elaborates three principal 
concealments of the abandonment of being: (a) 
calculation (the machination of technicity 
grounded in mathematical knowing), (b) 
acceleration (a mania for what is fleeting and not-
being-able-to-hear the stillness of hidden 
growth), and (c) the outbreak of massiveness 
(what is common to the many and to all) 
(Heidegger, 1989/1999, p. 84-85).  
 
Through this concealment of the abandonment of 
being, the distress of Be-ing is forgotten into a 
lack of distress (the concealment of the distress 
of Be-ing).  Heidegger describes this lack of 
distress toward the distress of Be-ing as the 
utmost distress (Heidegger, 1989/1999, p. 79). 
 
 
Toward an Enownment of Palliative Care 
How can Heidegger’s philosophical work 
illuminate the topic at hand - the ‘death 
technologies’ in modern Western life that seek to 
bring comfort and peace to those who are dying 
or grieving? 
 
In the prevalent Western view, death is 
commonly regarded as an adversary to life that 
ought to be overcome. This was grippingly 
revealed in the events of September 11th, as 
extra-ordinary efforts were devoted toward the 
‘rescue’ and ‘retrieval’ of victims. 
  
Immediately apparent in death technologies is a 
prevailing tone of leaping in that strives to 
minimize the ‘negative’ impact of death.  This 
has been institutionalized through a systematic 
machination that has created various 
pharmacological, psychological, and legal tools.  
These are sought after and applied with the aim 
of diminishing the distress of dying. 
  
When the life-saving efforts of curative modern 
medicine ‘fail’ at preventing death (an ultimate 
form of leaping in), palliative care ought to 
ensure a ‘good death.’ These strategies are 
fashioned within the expedient instrumental 
ideals of modern scientific technology, grounded 
on calculative thought.  Scientific theories are 
formulated through research that conveys a 
representational thinking about death. Death is 
ontified (i.e., wherein Being is concealed) 
through explanatory models that depict what a 
‘normal’ death ought to look like - and how 
‘abnormal’ dying can be adjusted to this 
representative image. 
  
Such coherent theoretical and research 
representations of death suggest an Enframing 
challenging of the nature of death.  These 
presume a nature of death as a calculable real 
entity that can be entrapped and refined into a 
reserve of objective ‘death knowledge.’  These 
strive to arrive at a stance of certainty and 
security toward death. 
 
Also, the performance of religious rituals, 
without a broader questioning of the meaning of 
Be-ing and death, and the modern expression of 
self-determination through living wills, without a 
contemplation of the sense of self (or will) that is 
implied, disclose a machinational orientation that 
privileges technique over a foundational 
grounding questioning.   On occasion, all of this 
is complemented with the use of art to further 
comfort the experience of death by providing 
some aesthetic respite from the distress of death. 
 
All of these could be regarded as forms of 
‘activity in passivity’ (i.e., everyday activity that 
is passive with regard to its questioning of its 
own Be-ing). 
 
Heidegger would neither praise nor criticize these 
initiatives. They resonate with Dasein’s life in the 
average everydayness of ‘the they’ striving to 
conceal and forget the distress of being that is 
disclosed to Dasein in the face of its finitude. 
These disclose Dasein’s abandonment of being - 
a struggle that was revealed so vividly by Ivan 
Ilych’s search for refuge from death. 
  
Death technologies also reveal Dasein’s 
machinational inclinations. That is, it is 
remarkable that even in the face of an abstract 
intangible phenomenon such as death, Dasein 
searches for instrumental means with which to 
control (and entrap) its own finitude. 
 
However, when such a concerted machinational 
effort dominates being toward death in an 
unquestioning way, Dasein (be it the dying 
Dasein or the witnessing Dasein) does not 
encounter death as a limit. A central truth of Be-
ing is concealed from Dasein. Death technologies 
examine and ‘care’ for the dying, but this is only 
one way in which Dasein presences in death. 
Dasein, in its Being-toward-death cannot be 
enframed. 
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Although a calculative outlook toward death may 
be useful, this is not sufficient. Heidegger turns to 
an ancient Greek sense of theoretical 
understanding, whereby we look at something 
attentively such that what presences (i.e., death) 
becomes visible, and through such seeingo, we 
linger with it. This strives toward an aletheia 
unconcealment of Being-toward-death - a 
responsible bringing forth poiesis. This would 
disclose to Dasein that death is ownmost, non-
relational, an existential possibility, and 
inevitable - the authentic unconcealment of death 
to Dasein (Heidegger, 1962, p. 303). 
 
Heidegger calls for an authentic Enowned stance 
toward death. That is, Dasein’s encounter with 
death provides it with a possibility for 
contemplative questioning of the truth of its Be-
ing.  Such questioning would unconceal Dasein’s 
distress and reveal the limitations of its own 
finitude. An authentic Be-ing-toward-death 
reveals the temporality and omnipresence of the 
truth of Be-ing. 
 
Also, the ‘nothing’ of Be-ing-toward-death will 
be disclosed to Dasein, but not as the absence of 
life. The ‘nothing’ is unconcealed as would the 
dark if it were examined without throwing a light 
onto it, which would otherwise make it become 
‘not dark.’ 
 
This contemplative thinking about death is not 
directly oppositional to the calculative efforts of 
Dasein. Rather, in the light of such foundational 
thinking, the latter would be understood in 
relation to Dasein’s sway of Be-ing. That is, it 
would be seen for what it is - an attempt to flee 
from the distress of Be-ing made manifest by this 
encounter with its own finitude. From a 
perspective of Enownment, which contemplative 
thought would foster, the techne of the 
calculative efforts of death technologies can be 
seen as a bringing-forth poiesis - albeit not an 
exclusively primordial one. As stated earlier, the 
instrumentality of death technologies can 
poetically bring forth a revealing unconcealment. 
 
 Heidegger does not explicate how a 
contemplative stance toward death ought to 
unfold, because such a form of Be-ing is 
ownmost (i.e., particular to one’s own 
experience) and therefore cannot be prescribed as 
a universal (das Man) objectified set of practices. 
However, his writings suggest that this would 
involve a silent presencing in Dasein’s Be-ing-
toward-death, swaying in the distress of Be-ing. 
Despite Dasein’s attempts to retreat into the lack 
of distress of ‘the they,’ the distress of the lack of 
distress will call on Dasein’s contemplative 
thoughts (as was the inevitable case for Ivan 
Ilych). 
 
In relation to an ‘other,’ Dasein would resist the 
urge in ‘the they’ to leap in and attempt to try to 
take death away. Rather, Dasein ought to leap 
ahead and strive to give death back to the other. 
In other words, a Heideggerian approach seeks to 
foster a contemplative awareness of the dying of 
an other, and its existential significance for the 
other as well as one’s own experience, rather than 
primarily trying to comfort or diminish the 
profound dread and anxiety that dying entails. 
 
An Enowned knowing of death would be 
grounded on a bringing-forth poiesis.  Art would 
not be regarded as a simple means of distraction 
from the distress of being.  Rather, that which 
dwells in the distressing finitude of Be-ing that is 
revealed by death - is artful, poetic.  
 
Art can enable such presencing (as Tolstoy 
attempts to convey through the voice of Ivan 
Ilych). Drawing on Aristotle’s theory of tragedy, 
Gadamer has argued that the misery of tragic art 
can ‘overwhelm man and sweep him away’ 
(Gadamer, 1960/1975, p. 130).  ‘The elevation 
and strong emotion that seize the spectator in fact 
deepen his continuity with himself.  Tragic 
pensiveness flows from the self-knowledge that 
the spectator acquires’ (Gadamer, 1960/1975, p. 
133). In other words, the authentic sway of Be-
ing itself poetically reveals the truth of Be-ing. 
The art of poiesis is not a means but an end in 
itself in Dasein’s swaying toward its own 
Enownment.  Turning to artful expressions of the 
existential realm of dying can help foster an 
authentic understanding of human finitude. 
 
The instrumentality of death technologies is 
based on a premise of respect for self-
determination. Heidegger’s work enlightens our 
understanding of death, as an existential 
dimension of the Be-ing of Dasein. This calls for 
a contemplative leap into an Enownment of Be-
ing-toward-death that provides a foundational 
grounding for a truly authentic self-determining 
freedom.  
 
In addition to the helpful contributions that death 
technologies, such as palliative care, can offer to 
our concern for death, a primordial importance 
should be attributed toward an authentic 
Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology, Volume 5, Edition 1 April 2005  Page 10 of 12 
The Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology (IPJP) can be found at www.ipjp.org.  
The IPJP is a joint project of Rhodes University in South Africa and Edith Cowan University in Australia. This 
document is subject to copyright and may not be reproduced in whole or in part via any medium (print, 
electronic or otherwise) without the express permission of the publishers. 
recognition of our Be-ing, as one that exists 
within its own finitude. This will require 
contemplative attention, instead of technological, 
toward the existential realm of our Being-toward-
death. This can be fostered through the (poetic) 
arts, wherein figures such as Ivan Ilych can help 
illuminate this contemplation.  Finally, the very 
process of this contemplation is in itself a poetic 
artful engagement. 
 
Death here enters the domain of 
foundational mindfulness, not in order 
to teach a ‘philosophy of death’ as a 
matter of ‘worldview’ but in order to put 
the question of being above all onto its 
ground and to open up Da-sein as the 
ground that is held to ab-ground, to shift 
Dasein into projecting-open, that means 
under-standing in the sense of Being 
and Time (not for example to make 
death ‘understandable’ to journalists 
and philistines) (Heidegger, 1989/1999, 
p. 201).  
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i The term ‘modern Western’ is used here in the sense developed by Charles Taylor (1989; 1992). This refers 
to the dominant contemporary Euro-American cultural worldview characterized by extreme individualism and 
technical proficiency that conceals underlying questions about the existential meaning of being. 
ii Being is capitalized to indicate that Heidegger refers to a particular sense of being.  In his later work, he 
added a hyphen, to create Be-ing, in order to highlight the active signification of the term that he intended. 
iii Such ‘restorative’ acts seem rooted in widely held modern Western cultural beliefs, values, and rituals 
regarding the living and dead body (Taylor, 1989; 1992). 
iv It should be highlighted that this discussion of death technologies does not refer exclusively to palliative 
care medicine, but includes various other forms of death-oriented therapies and services.  I would like also to 
note that some models of palliative care do not limit themselves to the technologized construal of death that 
this paper critiques.  Rather, some forms of palliative care practice are highly congruent with the 
Heideggerian authentic stance toward death that I describe in this paper. 
v This brief synthesis of Heidegger’s philosophy employs numerous terms that have been italicized to indicate 
that he construed these with particular meanings.  Although these terms are defined here very briefly, to not 
impede the flow of the discussion, it should be noted that most of these imply highly complex and contested 
meanings.  A discussion of these controversies is beyond the scope of this paper. 
vi Heidegger has drawn the term Poiesis from ancient Greek philosophy to refer to a creative artful making 
from within, that is aimed at revealing the truth about fundamental questions.  Poiesis refers to an 
existentially-grounded form of art that reveals the truth of being, facing the deepest dreads and worries of 
human life, rather than art that merely aims to momentarily delight the viewer through its technical beauty. 
vii Heidegger employed the term Dasein to signify his specific conception of being human. Every Dasein is 
torn in a struggle between (a) what Heidegger refers to as life in ‘the they’ (or das Man) which implies an 
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average everyday instrumental existence that conceals fundamental existential questions and (b) an authentic 
attunement to Dasein’s own questioning about the meaning of its being. 
viii This can relate to some forms of grief or death ‘therapies’ that attempt to lessen the distress of dying.  This 
is mistaken, according to Heidegger, because of the existential fact that death belongs solely to the one that is 
dying – a fact that is most apparent in an authentic confrontation with one’s own mortality, as expressed by 
Ivan Ilych. 
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